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NOTES

itself from seeing it rather than imposing its idiosyncracies on others,
it is hard to put the ideal into practice.
Whether the group has the direct sanction of government on any
level, or is merely a social or religious pressure group, its members
will think, at least subconsciously, that their own particular dogma
and beliefs are correct not only for themselves, but for all society,
and will act accordingly. This has been unfortunately demonstrated
time and again.
Though there are certain constants in our society, many values
are still relative, and opinions and mores vary at least superficially
from group to group. Therefore, perhaps it would be best to look
to the method adopted by the English, namely that of the advisory
review board. In this country, regional review boards could be set
up to inform the people of the content of a particular motion picture without editorializing. In this way, the final adjudication of
the merits of the cinematic product could be made by the one most
closely affected in the final analysis: the movie-goer. Children
would be protected through the guidance of parents, who would
themselves be kept informed by means of the regional board of
review.
By some means such as this both governmental and pressure
group censorship might be eliminated. Both are objectionable on
the same principle. They attempt to give to the few the power to
decide what is best for the many. This is essentially totalitarian,
and diametrically contrary to our democratic principles of government.
THALES L. SECREST

INSURANE-DUTY

TO DEFEND

UNDER

LIABILITY

PoLicy.-Nearly

every liability insurance policy contains a clause in which the insurer agrees to defend suits brought against the insured. Such defense clauses are limited to suits for damages resulting from acts
or omissions of the insured which are covered by the policy. The
problem to be considered arises when the company refuses to defend, claiming that the action is not one which is covered by. the
policy. This situation frequently presents itself when the allegations in the complaint do not clearly establish whether the action
is within the coverage or outside the coverage of the policy.
This problem has been the subject of much legal controversy
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and has been called the "Insurance Company's Dilemma".1 By electing to defend, the insurer waives its right to assert non coverage
and will not be allowed to seek reimbursement from the insured
for the costs of defense if in fact there was no coverage. By refusing to defend, the insurer gives up the valuable privilege of
directing the defense of an action seeking damages which it may
be required to pay. Since the courts have often based their decisions on the terms of the contracts and the particular wording
therein many cases are applicable only to their own unique situations.
As a rule, the insurer is under a duty to defend any suit against
the insured when the facts alleged in the complaint state a cause
of action within the terms of the policy.2 This is true even though
the action is groundless or the allegations false.- Thus, the obligation to defend matures when the action is brought and does not
depend upon the result of the trial.4 It is immaterial whether the
facts alleged are proved or not; the costs of defense will be taxed
against the insurer.'
Besides the duty to defend, of course, the insurance company has
the duty to pay; i.e., the duty to compensate the judgment suitor.
The relationship between these two duties is an important factor
in the consideraton of the whole problem. Whether they are considered dependent or entirely independent will directly affect the
the rights of the parties. It has been held that the duty to pay is
of no consequence if the complaint brings the action within the
risks covered by the policy.' In holding the insurer liable for defense costs, a New York court said,
"The distinction between liabilty and coverage must be kept in
mind. So far as concerns the obligation of the insurer to defend
the question is not whether the injured party can maintain a
cause of action against the insured but whether he can state facts
1. See comment, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 383 (1950)
(Two possible solutions are offered,
viz., the nonwaiver agreement and the declaratory judgment. A nonwaiver agreement
provides that the insurer will defend the suit against the insured, but that it reserves
the right to later assert noncoverage. A declaratory judgment will definitely settle the
question of the insurer's obligation to defend).
2. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53.
56-57 (4th Cir. 1952); Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 178 F. 2d 750, 752-753 (2d
Cir. 1949); Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365, 365-366 (1932).
3. See, e.g., Employers' Liability A. Corp. v. Youghioheny & 0. Coal Co., 214 F.2d
418, 422 (8th Cir. 1954); Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 121
Ohio St. 220, 167 N.E. 884, 886 (1929).
4. See Employers' Liability A. Corp. v. Youghiegheny & 0. Coal Co., 214 F.2d 418,
422 (8th Cir. 1954).
5: Minnesota Electric Distributing Co. v. United States F. & G. Co., 173 Minn. 114,
216 N.W. 784 (1927).
6. Grand Union Co. v. General Ace., Etc., Assur. Corp., 254 App. Div. 274, 4
NY.S.2d 704, aff'd, 279 N.Y. 638, 18 N.E.2d 38 (1938).
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which bring the injury within the coverage. If he states such facts
the policy requires the insurer to defend irrespective of the insured's ultimate liability." I
In one case the complaint alleged that the automobile causing the
injury was hired by the insured and was being driven by an employee of the insured for whose actions he was responsible, The
court held the insurer under a duty to defend despite the fact
that the insured had not hired the automobile in question and
in reality had no connection whatsoever with the accident.
The majority of courts hold that a complaint filed against the insured, which on its face states circumstances not within the coverage of the policy, need not be defended by the insurer. For example, a suit based on a complaint alleging the insured's automobile
was driven by one under the age limit stated in the policy is not
considered to be within the terms of the policy, and most courts
will not hold the insurer liable for costs of defense.' 0 This exact situation, however, came before an Ohio court in 1932 and the insurer was held obligated to defend.'.' The defense clause was construed as an unconditional promise to defend and independent
of the other terms of the policy. This decision was later apparently
overruled."' If an action is based on several grounds, only one of
13
which is within its coverage, the insurer is required to defend.
The courts generally have ruled that the defense clause, while quite
broad in its wording, is to some extent dependent on and correlative with the rest of the policy-in other words, the contract must
be construed as a whole.' 4 Any uncertainty or ambiguity in the
contract is to be construed most strongly against the insurer and in
7. Id. 4 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
8.

Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline Co. v. Union Indemnity

Co., 121 Ohio

St. 220, 167 N.E.

884 (1929).
9. See, e.g., Daniel v. State Farm Mot. Ins.

Co., 233 Mo.

App. 1081,

130

S.W.2d

244, 250 (1939); Farmers Cooperative Soc. No. 1 v. Maryland Gas Co., 135 SW.2d 1033,
1038

(Tex.

Civ.

App. 1939); U.

S.

Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Baldwin

Motor Co.,

34 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931).
10. E.g. United Waste Mfg. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 85 Misc. 539, 148 N.Y.Supp.

852 (1914); Fulton Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 138 Tenn. 278, 197 S.W. 866
(1917); Ocean Acci. & G. Corp. v. Washington Brick & Terra Cotta Co., 148 Va. 829, 139
S.E. 513 (1927).
11. Union Indemnity Co. v. Mostov, 41 Ohio App. 518, 181 N.E. 495 (1932).
12. Luchte v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Ohio App. 5, 197 N.E. 421 (1935)
(Injury resulted from insured's employee leaving a pile of coal in the street which
plaintiff ran into on his motorcycle. Insurer was not required to defend under auto'
mobile liability policy).

13. Christian v. Royal Ins. Co., 185 Minn. 180, 240 N.W. 365 (1932).
14.

See e.g., American Fidelity Co. v. Deerfield Valley'Grain Co., 43 F.

Supp.

841,

845 (D. Vt. 1942); Continental Cas. Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279, 081
(1934).
"It is a cardinal principle of construction that a contract is to be construed
as a whole; that all its parts are to be harmonized so far as reasonably possible; that
every word in it is to be given effect, if possible; and that no part is to be taken as
eliminated or stricken by some other part unless such a result is fairly inescapable."
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favor of the insured, 15 but the courts ". . must avoid putting a
strained and unnatural construction on the terms of the policy. . ." 11
The application of the principle that the duty to defend is independent of the duty to pay has led to some rather unnatural conclusions. One frequently criticized case, for instance, held the insurer must pay the costs of defense where the plaintiff was injured
while riding in insured's truck, even though the truck was excluded
from coverage under the policy as a commercial vehicle.17 In another case the costs of defense were imposed on the insurer though
the complaint alleged the employee was under the eighteen year
age limit of the policy.1- It was held that the burden was on the
insurer to prove the employee's non-age. It is an apparent inconsistency to require the insurer to determine by investigation the
truth of the facts alleged on the face of the complaint when on the
other hand, the courts allow the insured to rely on the complaint
alone in demanding defense.
A situation of a more complex nature arises when the complaint
neither brings the action clearly within the terms of the policy,
nor establishes it as being outside the terms of the policy. A New
York court said:
"In such a situation it would seem to be the duty of the insurer
to defend, if there is, potentially, a case under the negligence
complaint, within the coverage of the policy. If, under the negli
gence complaint a claim could be proved, which the insurer must
pay, the duty to defend arises." 19
In that case, the insurer had refused to defend on the ground that
the complaint did not state a cause of action within the terms of
the policy. The policy provided that the coverage ceased when the
insured had completed its operations under a plumbing contract.
The complaint merely alleged that the insured performed the work
and the injury took place on the same day. In holding the insurer
liable for the costs of defense, the court suggested that, in a situation such as this the insurer might protect itself by having the com15. See e.g., Lee v. Aetna Cas & Surety Co., 178 F.2d 750, 753 (2d Cir. 1949);
Sampson v. Century Indemnity Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434, 436 (1937); Freese
v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 252 S.W.2d 653, 656 (Mo. 1952).
16. See Sampson v. Century Indemnity Co., 8 Cal. 2d 476, 66 P.2d 434, 437 (1937).
17. City Poultry & Egg Co. v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 297 Mich. 509, 298 N.W. 114,
115 (1941). "We are of the opinion that the undertaking to defend and the undertaking for payment of damages are severable and independent. . . . The insurance company could. have limited its obligation to the defense of suits where, on the facts, the
insurance company was liable to the insured in case of judgment."
18. University Club v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 124 Pa. Super. 480, 189
Atl. 534 (1937).
19. Pow-Well Plumbing & Heat. v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 195 Misc. 251, 89
N.Y.S. 2d 469, 474 (1949).
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plaint amplified by a bill of particulars. An earlier Texas case likeThe court considered
wise held the insurer obligated to defend.20
the facts alleged sufficient to apprise the insurer that the plaintiff
was suing the insured as her employer, although the complaint
stated the name of another. Thus, "The negligence complaint together with the policy (not the factual situation, determined by
the insurer) establishes whether there is or is not a duty to defend." " On the other hand, if the insured settles the claim under
consideration, ".. . questions of coverage, liability and the extent
thereof are still open and are questions of fact." " The insurer is
bound by the result of litigation on a claim within the policy if it
has had notice and an opportunity to present its defense through
its own counsel.2"
Under the terms of most liability insurance policies, the insurer
is under a duty to defend groundless suits.2 4 The relation between
the duty to defend and the other terms of the policy cannot be ignored even in the case of groundless suits. A clear statement of
the correlation between these two duties was made by a Pennsylvania court:
"It is obvious that the company's obligation was not to defend
all suits and claims whatsover merely because they were groundless, but to defend all suits and claims covered by the policy
whether or not they were groundless." 25
An insurer may be convinced that the complaint filed against its
insured does not state a cause of action within the terms of the
policy. The company may prefer to avoid the expense of a declaratory judgment and may merely decline to defend. If such were
the case, would the insurer be exposing itself to liability in excess
of the policy limits if the action proved to be within the coverage
of the policy? In a leading Minnesota case the court held that the
insurer was not liable for a judgment exceeding the limits of the
policy. 20 The opinion stated that the failure to defend as required
by the contract clearly did not create any greater liability. The
insurer, however, had lost the exclusive right to direct the suit.
The insurer, of course, was held liable for the entire cost of the
20. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bluestein,
21. Pow-Well Plumbing & Heat.
N.Y.S.2d 469, 477 (1949).
22. Id. at 472.
23. Id. at 472.
24. 4 Richards, Insurance 2086
policy ).
25. Wilson v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
26. Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas
189 (1921).

149 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 195 Misc. 251, 89

(5th

ed.,

Freedman,

1952)

(copy

of standard

377 Pa. 588, 105 A.2d 304, 306 (1954).
Cas. & Surety Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.W.
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defense -with no proportionate reduction based on his judgment
liability.
A distinction between the refusal to defend and the refusal to
settle must be kept in mind. An unreasonable refusal to accept a
settlement will be considered bad faith and will subject the insurer
to liabilty in excess of the express limits of the policy. 2" Some jurisdictions have held that an insurer's negligence in failing to settle
will subject it to the same excess liability. 28 Mistake, however, will
not be considered bad faith. 9 Whether a refusal to accept settlement is bad faith or not will depend primarily upon the circumo
stances of each case.
EXHAUSTION OF POLICY

LiMITs-DuTY

TO DEFEND

An unusual situation presents itself when the amount specified
as the limit of the company's liability has been exhausted. Obviously there is no duty to pay subsequent judgments and a logical
assumption would be that the duty to defend is also terminated.
This was not the result reached, however, by the New York Supreme Court in American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft
Sp. 31 The insurer had agreed to pay negligence judgments obtained up to a limit of $300,000.00 per accident. One of the
insured's pleasure vessels floundered due to insured's failure to
secure accurate weather reports and forty-six persons lost their
lives. Eleven separate wrongful death actions were instituted
claiming an aggregate recovery of $1,476,830.60. Insurer petitioned
for declaratory judgment to determine, inter alia, whether it
was required to defend the actions beyond the policy limits. It
was held that the insurer must defend all actions based upon the
disaster covered in the policy. It is significant to note that the policy
contained the usual defense clause.
The first theory advanced by the court in holding the insurer
liable for defense costs was based on the wording of the defense
clause.
"As we read the policy, the obligation to defend applies to
accidents within the scope of the hazards covered during the
calendar life of the contract. Nowhere is there language making
27. E.g., American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830 (10th
Cir. 1949); American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932);
Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 104 N.E. 622 (1914).
28. Douglas v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 Atl. 708 (1924);
Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933);
8 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4713 (1942).
29. Mendota Electric Co. v. Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61 (1928).
30. See National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 203 Okla. 175 200 P.2d 407, 412 (1948),
31. 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d !93 (1954).
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the defense provisions dependent upon the exhaustion of the
specified coverage. The phraselogy used by plantiff 'as respects
the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy the company shall: (a) defend any suit against the insured " *' is clear
positive and unambiguous and should be accorded its plain and
ordinary meaning." 11
In direct conflict with this interpretation is a case involving similar
facts and an identical defense clause. The court said:
"It [the insurer] was obligated to defend [the insured] 'as
respects insurance afforded by this policy', and there being no
further insurance afforded, we are of the view that its obligation
to defend was likewise terminated. Defendant's theory would
produce the incongruous situation that plaintiff would have a
continuing obligation to defend, notwithstanding its obligation
to pay has been exhausted. We are of the view that no such
liability was intended by the provisions in question and
that it
3
cannot reasonably be so construed." (italics supplied) 3
The two cases cannot be distinguished. In each, the aggregate
total of damages sought in suits pending far exceeded the limits of
the company's liability; and in each, the company had been willing to defend actions as long as insurance remained. The very wording of the policies limits the benefit of free defense to the policy
".terms". Certainly one of the terms of the policy is the limit upon
liability.
A second theory advanced in the Goble case was based upon the
premise that the promise to defend is an undertaking for the benefit
of the insured, not the insurer. 4 However, it seems that the insured has received his benefit when the insurer defends action
within the terms of the policy, i.e., within the limits of liability.
The promise to defend is also clearly an undertaking for the
benefit of the insurer since it reserves to the insurer the exclusive
right to direct the defense. "- Thus, the promise is actually for the
benefit of both parties.
The third theory offered in the Goble case was, "'...
that the
undertaking to defend and the undertaking for payment of dam-

32. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Sp., 205 Misc. 1066, 131
N.Y.S.2d 393, 400 (1954).
33. Danham v. La Salle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576, 584 (7th Cir.), rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948).
34. Cf. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750, 753
(1939) (dissenting opinion). ". . . the answer given in the majority opinion disregards the language in the policy and construes the promise of the insurance company
to defend, not as an undertaking for *the benefit of the assured, but as a stipulation
for the benefit of the insurer."
35. Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 Atl..788 (1936); 4 Richards, Insurance, 2086 (5th ed., Freedman, 1952) (copy of standard policy).
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ages were severable and independent.' '
This principle was
adopted by the Supreme Court of Michigan in attaining a result
inconsistent with the majority of.cases dealing with the insurer's duty
to defend actions outside the terms of the policy.37 The question
of how far the principle was intended to apply presents itself. Its
application in most cases will volate a cardinal rule of contract
construction, viz., the contract must be construed as a whole.,.
It ignores the intention of the parties to take one clause out of
context and apply it with no regard to the instrument of which it
is a part. To be sure that the clause would not be interpreted
independently, the policy expressly states that defense will be provided, ".... as respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of
this policy. . ."'I These words necessarily limit the application of
the clause to the rest of the policy.
The court in the Goble case cited one case holding the insurer
liable for defense costs of suits after exhaustion of the limit of
liability.4° However, an examination of that case reveals that there,
the policy limit had been exhausted only as to liability for bodily
injury. The subsequent suit which the insurer sought to avoid
defending claimed damages under the South Carolina survival
statute for pain and suffering and property damage with6ut separation of amount. Since the insurer still had an obligation to pay
for property damage, it was held under a duty to defend the suit.
This reasoning is clearly not applicable to the Goble case where the
entire limits of all liability had been exhausted.
The effect of the holding in the Goble case was to require the
insurance company to defend, at its own cost, actions claiming
nearly one and one half million dollars damages, as a result of
issuing a policy of insurance with express limits of $100,000 and
$300,000. It seems highly improbable that the parties to the contract intended this result.
CONCLUSION

Most of the nation's largest liability insurance companies have
now adopted a standard policy form.41 The insurer's duty to de36. American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Sp., 205 Misc. 1066, 131 N.Y.S.2d
393, 400 (1964).
37. City Poultry & Egg Co: v. Hawkeye Cas. Co., 297 Mich. 509, 398 N.W. 114 (1941);
See Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice §4684 n. 43 (1942).
38. See, e.g., American Fidelity Co. v. Deerfield Valley Grain Co., 43 F. Supp. 841,
845 (D. Vt. 1942); Continental Cas. Co. v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279, 281
(1934).
39. 4 Richards, Insurance 2086 (5th ed., Freedman, 1952) (standard policy).
40. American Cas. Co. of Reading v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951).
41. 4 Richards, Insurance 2083-2092 (5th ed., Freedman, 1952) (for an cxample
of a standard liability policy).
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fend is set out in the following words in the National Standard
Policy:
"As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this
policy the Company shall:
defend in his name and behalf any suit against the Insured
(a)
alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages on
account thereof, even if such.suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the Company shall have the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any' claim or suit as may
be deemed expedient by the Company;"42
Perhaps this clause is not so clear and unambguous as to eliminate
all controversy. Uniform interpretation of the policy by a number
of courts over a period of years would, however, lead to a body of
case law which the parties could look to for determination of their
respective rights under the insurance agreement.
Nearly all of those cases reaching anomalous results base their
conclusions upon essentially the same doctrine: the duty to defend
is independent of the duty to pay. It has been pointed out previously that the doctrine is inconsistent with well established rules
of contract construction. It singles out one promise of the insurer
and regards that promise alone as unconditional and bearing no
relation to the parent instrument. Yet, the doctrine is not entirely
wrong; it merely goes too far. It would lead to less confusion and
greater uniformity of application if a new principle were substituted3
4
in its place: the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay.
Thus, the distinction between the two would be recognized without
losing sight of their relation.
JON

N.

VOGEL

TORTS-CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-IMMUNITY FROM
TORT LIABILITY.-What is that abstraction called "justice"?
As relating to jurisprudence, it has been defined as the constant
and perpetual disposition to render every man his due.' However,
the process of rendering every man his due is conditioned upon
the mores of a particular society at a particular time. The development of social concepts must, of necessity, imply a parallel development in the law of the land if the ends of justice are to be
attained.
42. 4 Richards, op. cit. supra note 41 at 2086.
43. See Golberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131, 133
(1948),
1. See Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 54 Am.Dec. 217, 221 (1851)-.

